## STATE OF MICHIGAN

## COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of LAURA ANN TACK, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

JUNE KOTEL,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

THOMAS KOTEL,

Respondent.

Before: Davis, P.J., and Sawyer and Schuette, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).

Respondent-appellant challenges only the lower court's decision that termination was not clearly against the child's best interests. After the lower court determines that the petitioner established a statutory ground for termination, it must terminate the respondent's parental rights unless termination is clearly not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo Minors*, 462 Mich 341, 352-353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

Respondent-appellant's prior terminations were relevant because the way a parent treated one child is probative of how she will treat another child. *In re AH*, 245 Mich App 77, 84-85; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). In the present case, respondent-appellant's past demonstrated that her stay in deplorable conditions was not an isolated event. She failed to explain how she would avoid repeating the problem again. She was employed in the same job when her utilities were shut off and she felt forced to live in her mother's dirty, crowded home. The child was also unclean when taken into custody and reportedly gained 12 pounds in two months in foster care. The psychologist who evaluated respondent-appellant opined that she was unable to care for herself

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No. 267852 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 05-708384-NA without assistance and continued blaming others for her mistakes. Respondent-appellant received numerous services.

The psychologist also found that the child felt a minimal bond to her mother, which was significant. See *In re AH*, *supra* at 89. The child needed permanency. See *In re McIntyre*, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). Although respondent-appellant correctly notes that it is relevant how long the child can wait for permanency, *In re Dahms*, 187 Mich App 644, 647-648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991), she fails to explain how that supports her argument.

The lower court did not err when it held that termination was not clearly against the child's best interests and terminated respondent-appellant's parental rights.

Affirmed.

/s/ Alton T. Davis /s/ David H. Sawyer /s/ Bill Schuette